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divisions and unions in possession of the rights, immunities and
privileges which legal sanctions give.
The legal provisions and principles applicable to these, the
forms by which they are perfected, the measure and mode of
redress, remain to be considered hereafter.
Wm. LAWRENCE.
BELrEONTAnm, 0.
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CONKEY v. MILWAUKEE AND ST. PAUL RAILROAD CO.
A railway company is liable as a common carrier, and is an insurer of the
goods, not only while the goods are in actual transit over its line of railway, but
unitl an actual delivery of the goods to the next succeeding carrier.
If the succeeding carrier should refuse to accept delivery of the goods, or in
case of a break or interruption in the line of transit, as by storm, flood or earthquake, or by fact of war, rendering it impossible to send the goods forward, or
causing considerable delay in the transportation, the carrier might relieve itself of
its strict liability as a common carrier by storing the goods and notifying the owner
or consignor thereof.
The case of Wood v. Railway Company, 27 Wis. 541, overruled.
THE

defendant operating a line of railroad between Milwaukee

vention of each diocese to prescribe a form of organizing a particular parish. As
an example, the form adopted by the Diocese of Missouri will be found in the
journal of the 31st Annual Convention of the P. E. Church in the diocese: May
1871, p. 122, Appx. No. 12.

For form in Maryland, see "Compilation," referred to in note 38, ante.
Both the Associate and Congregational Churches may have articles of association, and a constitution of the church; and these may be adopted both in the
canonical and the legal organization.of a particular church. The form of canonical
and legal organization of a parish in the Diocese of Missouri is given in the journal of the Annual Convention above referred to, and in the journal of the Convention of 1871, p. 127, Appx. No. 18, is given the constitution of the church in
the diocese regarding it as a diocesan body.
In the [late German] Reformed Church in the United States, the usage is for
each congregation to adopt a constitution and by-laws. A form is given in the
proceedings of the Synod of Ohio for 1850, p. 71.
The General Synod of 1866 recommended that the constitution should be "em.
braced in the charters of all the churches :" Proceedings, p. 19. And see Proceedings of Synod of 1869, p. 86, for form of incorporation.
There is a general constitution for the entire church, subject to the legislative
power of the General Synod.
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and La Crosse, received at Milwaukee goods addressed to the
plaintiffs at Preston, Minnesota, to be carried over its line of road
to La Crosse, and there delivered to the Southern Minnesa
Railroad Company, the next succeeding carrier, in the line of
carriage. The goods were so transported over the defendant's
line of road to La Crosse, arriving there on the 12th, 18th and
14th days of May 1871, and were placed in defendant's warehouse
for delivery to the next succeeding carrier, and while so awaiting
carriage were destroyed by fire on the night of the 15th of May.
Jenkins & Elliott, for plaintiffs and respondents.
John W. Cary, for defendant and appellant.
DIxoN, C. J.-The learned counsel for the railway company
asked permission at the bar, and the request was also joined in
by counsel for the plaintiff, and leave was granted by the court,
to reargue the point decided in Wood v. Railway Company, 27
Wis. 541, that where a common carrier conveys goods over only
a portion of the route between the places of shipment and consignment and holds them for delivery to some connecting carrier,
the liability of the former as a common carrier continues until the
goods are ready for delivery to the connecting carrier and until
the latter has had a reasonable time to take them away. The
"reasonable time" as there defined was said to be the earliest
practicable time after the first carrier is ready to deliver, and is
not measured by any peculiar circumstances in the condition of
the second carrier, requiring for its convenience that it should
have a longer time.
Against the rule thus laid down, counsel on both sides in this
case, as well as in some others involving the same question, most
earnestly and vehemently protest on account of the great uncertainty which must exist in its application to particular cases, and
the likelihood of most tedious and expensive litigation which may
follow in determining the rights of the owner of the goods or the
liability of the carrier in almost every such case of loss. Counsel
say, and say truly, that the inquiries of fact upon which the issue
is made to depend, are of the most equivocal, perplexing and
doubtful character, such as the parties will seldom agree upon,
and such as will often divide the jury. They say that the expression, "reasonable time," is suggestive of the most embarrassing
vagueness and uncertainty, opening wide the door to speculation
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and diversity of opinion in many cases, and that where one jury
may say "yes," another upon the very same state of facts may answer "no," whilst a third may fail to agree altogether. Counsel
cry out against this uncertainty, these doubts and embarrassments,
and pray that whatever rule may be established, it may be a
certain one, freed from these difficulties, and plain and easy of
application. It is equally argued on both sides that the rule
contended against is a departure from the true principles or policy
of the law in such: cases.
For the railway company the position assumed is that its liability as carrier should cease whenever the goods are removed
from its cars, and thenceforth it should be responsible to the
owner for the property in its possession only in the character or
capacity of a warehouseman or a depositary for hire. This is
the rule in some states, and it has the advantage of that convenience and certainty of application for which counsel contend
On the other hand, the position taken by counsel for the plain
tiff is that the removal and deposit of the goods in the warehouse,
preparatory to a delivery of them to the next carrier and for
that purpose is a part, and a necessary and indispensable part,
according to the method of transportation and conveyance adopted
and in use by railway companies and some other carriers, of the
act of carriage itself, and that the liability of the last carrier, as
such, does not, under ordinary circumstances, cease until thu
goods have been actually delivered to, or placed in the custody
and control or under the management and direction of the next
carrier, so that the liability of a common carrier shall have attached
to the latter in case of the loss or destruction of the goods from
any cause not exempting a common carrier frpm responsibility.
The position assumed in this behalf is that the warehousing, so
called, of goods thus in transit over different connecting routes,
and which have not reached their place of destination or ultimate
delivery, is merely incidental and subsidiary to the principal or
main act of carriage, and a part of that act. With respect to
goods and property so on the way or going forward, the position,
except under extraordinary or peculiar circumstances, recognises
no such thing as an interruption of a common carrier's liability
or of the protection afforded by that principle of the common law
so far as it respects the rights and remedies of the shipper or
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owner of the goods. The position rejects entirely the doctrine,
as to goods thus in the ordinary course of transit, that the common carrier in whose possession they are, may be now a common
carrier and now only a warehouseman, according as the good.s
may be in motion in the cars or other vehicles, or at rest upon a
platform or in a depot or other place of temporary deposit. It
ignores entirely the assumption that as to such goods and under
such circumstances the carrier can become a mere warehouseman
and liable only in that capacity to the shipper or owner, but declares that as to him the character or capacity of common carrier
remains unchanged with the possession of the goods, and until
the same has been parted with by delivery to the next carrier.
It regards depots and other buildings erected by the carrier in
which goods passing over the route are thus temporarily housed
and protected from loss or damage by the elements as well as
from the depredations of thieves and trespassers, as structures
for convenience merely of the carrier himself, or not only convenient but essential to his business as a carrier during these pauses or
rests made necessary by the system or mode of transportation which
now almost universally prevails. It looks upon the warehouses and
other buildings and places for storage merely as concomitants of
the carrying business, auxiliary and subservient thereto, but not
as giving the carrier any distinct or separate character or buiiness with respect to the goods so en route and in his possession
and custody. It holds the warehouses of railway companies ustructures designed to facilitate their business as carriers, by i.abling the companies to carry out a system of separatiom, classification and delix cry of goods received and carried, with oft which
there would be no possibility of conducting their carlying business with the requisite precision and despatch, or with any ease
or profit.
Such are some of the views, briefly expressed and in my awn
language, which were urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, and such is the rule they would have the court sanction and
adopt as the true and sound one in the law. It will .be seen, too,
that this rule has the same advantage of certainty and of convenience and clearness of application as that propounded and
urged by counsel for the railway company.
I must say that I was very forcibly impressed by the arguments
on both sides made at the bar, and such was the interest awakened
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in my mind that I at once gave the question an attentive and
thorough examination, as much so, at least, as my time and capacity, and the means at hand, would permit. I came to the conclusion with counsel on both sides that the rule of Wood v. The
Railway Company could not and ought not to stand, and that,
as is most apt to be the case with middle grounds, often of doubtful policy, and more often of dangerous tendency to sound principle, it failed in that clearness, certainty and convenience of
application which the true principles of law require and which is
indispensable to the facility, safety and confidence of business
transactions, and of all commercial dealings and traffic constantly
taking place over these great connecting routes of trade and communication. I became satisfied, that however in the various and
multiplied turns and complications of human affairs and relations,
doubts and uncertainties inhere in and are inseparable from
some legal rules, this was a case where they ought not to exist.
The rule here, whatever it is, should be definite and certain in its
application to all ordinary cases. There is no inherent difficulty
in making it so, and the immense interests of the carrying business of the country, as well as of trade and commerce, peremptorily demand it. In the multitude and importance of cases so
frequently arising, and which must ever thus continue, parties
cannot be delayed to palter and trifle, as it were, in a delusive
struggle for their rights over nice distinctions of fact and fine
shades of difference, which fade away into regions of obscurity,
and finally of total darkness, and which facts, when settled, settle
nothing after all but the particular case, leaving all others to be
contested and litigated over and over again upon the very same
grounds. I agree, therefore, with counsel on both sides when
they say the expenses attending this course of decision, or the
litigation which must follow, would be enormous, and that this
alone, without considering the other inconveniences and mischiefs
to which allusion has been made, is sufficient to condemn the
rule. I agree that any rule unnecessarily fraught with such evil
consequences is a bad one, and should be abandoned. This is
another of the numerous actions springing from the same unfortunate loss or destruction of property, as in Wood v. The Railway
Company.
The question comes up, therefore, which of the two rules propounded by counsel is the correct one and ought to be adopted,
VOL. XXI.-24
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for i conceive that I must in this case act upon and determine the
rights and liabilities of the parties according to one or the other.
In Ifoods v. The Railway Company, I assented to the rule laid
down not because I thought there was or could be, under ordinary
circumstances, a pause or cessation in the common carrier liability
with respect to the consignee or owner of the goods, during such
temporary rest and storage of them preparatory to delivery to
the next carrier, and during which also there would spring up and
exist only a warehouseman's or forwarder's liability, but I did so
on the supposition that the carrier's liability was to be continuous
until the goods reached their place of final destination, and where
they were to be delivered to the consignee or owner. My supposition and view was that the liability of the next carrier in the
connecting line or route, as a carrier, would attach the very
moment that of the last carrier, as such, would cease. In other
words, I considered that whenever the liability of the last carrier,
as such, ceased by lapse of reasonable time for the next carrier
to receive and carry forward the goods according to the usual
course of transportation and business after the goods were ready
for delivery to him, the liability of the latter as a carrier attached,
and he must be held to respond to the consignee or owner for
their value in case of the subsequent loss or destruction of them.
Such was my consideration of the question, and I placed it, not
upon the ground that the next carrier had become or was in any
sense the agent of the consignee, owner or shipper of the goods,
and in that character responsible to him for not receiving and
carrving them forward; but upon the ground of the usage and
custom among carriers so related to and connected with each
other in the business of transportation that their lines or routes,
-hough separately owned and managed, yet running into and
touching or uniting one with another in practical operation and
e.ffect, constitute one continuous route. The usage among carriers so connected or joining their routes, in the absence of
special contract or special notice to the contrary, is not only
well known in commercial and business circles, but is also known
and acted upon by the courts. Courts recognise and give force
and effect to to it: Schneider v. Evans, 25 Wis. 241, and cases
there cited. That usage, now become universal or very nearly
so, is for the railway company, receiving the goods destined for a
place beyond the terminus of its own route, to transport them
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over its own road and there deliver them to the next company or
carrier in the line of transit, collecting from the latter its own
charges for freight and transportation, whereupon the latter
becomes invested with a lien upon the goods for the charges so
advanced in addition to his rates or charges for the transportation
and delivery to the next succeeding carrier, who, in turn advances
the charges of the two that have preceded him,'and thus the process continues and is repeated until the goods have reached their
place of destination and are in the hands of the last carier
ready for delivery to the consignee or owner, subject to payment
to such carrier of the accumulated charges of all the preceding
carriers over whose routes they have been transported.
Now, it was upon this well-known custom and usage, amounting, as it does, to an implied contract or promise on the part of
each succeeding carrier to pay back charges and receive and
carry forward the goods brought to it by the preceding one, that
I relied as constituting the true ground of action or liability
against the succeeding carrier in case he unreasonably failed to
receive and carry forward the goods according to his implied contract or obligation, and as he had held himself out as ready and
willing, and promising to do. That contract or obligation I then
thought, and still think, created a liability on his part, coextensive with and similar in nature to his liability as a common carrier, in case he neglected or refused, in proper time and according
to the usual course of business, to receive the goods, and they were
afterwards and before coming to his possession lost or destroyed.
I then looked upon his liability, and still do, as being in extent
the same as if the loss or destruction had been of the goods in
his custody and possession as a common carrier. It was to
my mind like the case of goods delivered to a carrier for transportation, and which were destroyed before the transit commenced.
By the law of common carriers, their liability is fixed on receipt
of the goods, and if they are lost in the warehouse of the carrier
or elsewhere before the carriage commences, the carrier must
respond, unless the loss was caused by a force superior to and
beyond human agency and foresight, or by the public enemy, the
onus of showing which is upon the carrier: Blossom v. G'riffn, 13
N. Y. 569; Ladue v. Griffith, 25 Id. 364. I regarded the
goods when separated and set apart in the accustomed place in
the warehouse, and ready for delivery by the preceding carrier,
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and after a reasonable time had elapsed for the succeeding one tc
receive them, and when in the due course of business he should
have done so, as being pro hac'viee, if need be, in the warehouse
of the latter awaiting transportation by him, or if necessary, for
the purpose of the remedy constructively in his possession as a
common carrier.
Such were the views which I then entertained, and I have as
yet discovered no good reason for changing them.
I then
thought, and still think, that the loss, if possible, should be made
to fall on the carrier in fault, or him who appeared most so, and
it was for this reason I assented to the rule that the last carrier
should be held responsible, as such, only until a reasonable time
had elapsed for the next carrier to receive the goods, and not
after that time. I was not disposed tomake the last carrier responsible, without remedy for the faults and delinquencies of the
next, over whose movements and conduct he had no control. It
was upon this principle I yielded assent to the rule, and it did
not occur to me then there was any better or more satisfactory
solution of the difficulty.
It will be seen hence I did not assent to the rule on the ground
that the next carrier was the agent of the owner for the purpose
of receiving such delivery, which seems quite impossible. The
agency in such cases springs from the possession of the goods in
the hands of a carrier marked for some place beyond the terminus
-f his own route. Such carrier, from the fact of possession,
becomes the agent of the owner for the purpose of making or
tendering delivery of the goods to the next in the proper line of
transit. By the usage of the business in which he is engaged he
assumes to do that when he receives the goods, and it may properly enough be said to constitute a part of his undertakings as
carrier. The decision in Schneider v. Evans, means just thisand nothing more, and Mr. Justice LYON himself now concedes
the error in the application. Had particular attention been
directed to it at the time, it would undoubtedly have been corrected.
But the difficulties in the way of applying the rule are manifest
and manifold. It casts upon the owner of the goods the burden
and the risks of settling the rights and liabilities as between the
different carriers. It imposes upon him a task which in nearly
every case he will have no adequate or proper means of perform
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ing. He is often a stranger, residing in a distant part of the
country, and wholly unacquainted with the facts. Actual knowledge of the facts and of the particular system or mode of transacting the business, rests only with the agents and employees of
the carriers, and being adversely interested, it is not to be expected they will be free to communicate what they may know.
Indeed, it must be presumed they will refuse to give information
of facts which will charge their employers, if they know such
facts.
And a result of the rule may be to deprive the owner of all
remedy for the loss or destruction of his property after he* has
mulcted himself in two heavy bills of costs. He may come out
like Afr. Bromley with his portmanteau, with no right of action
against either carrier: .Midland Railway Co. v. Bromley, 8 J.
Scott 372 (84 E. 0. L. 372, 382, note e.) A verdict and judgment in an action against the last carrier settles nothing in a suit
against the next. In an action against the last the jury may
find that a reasonable time had elapsed, and in a suit against the
next they may find the reverse, and so the owner falls between
two fires.
And again the question arises, what is the proper way out of
these difficulties? I have examined not only the cases cited but
very many others, and have pondered the question well, at least
as well as I am capable of doing, as between the two rules laid
down by counsel, neither of which is unsupported by autbority,
and my conclusion is that the rule contended for by counsel for
the plaintiff is the correct and true one. In coming to this conclusion I have anxiously endeavored to recognise a rule which,
while it shall not prove injurious and embarrassing to the great
commercial interests of the country, shall, at the same time, protect the interests of the carriers, or, at all events, be of so much
aid and service to them that the proprietors of that interest shall
know and understand with clearness and certainty the full extent
of their obligations to the public.
I think in the absence of special contract or agreement to the
contrary, the true policy of .the law, now as much as ever and
even more, is to adhere to the strict rules of liability on the part
of common carriers established by the common law. I believe
the safety and protection of the trade and commerce of the country demand this, and I believe also that by the feeling of confi-
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dence and security thus created and given, the great carrying
interests of the country will be likewise ultimately benefited and
their prosperity promoted. I believe the true policy of the law
consists with giving the owner a certain, sure and ample remedy
in case of the loss or destruction of his goods while in the hands
of the carrier, and hence I reject the rule contended for by
counsel for the railway company, because it is calculated to give
the owner anything but such remedy. To admit the change in
capacity and liability from carrier to warehouseman at every
pause in the carriage over our long connected routes, would in
practice and effect be to say to the owner that he has no remedy.
To recover as against a warehouseman, the burden would be
upon the owner to establish the negligence. He must aver and
prove that his goods were negligently lost or destroyed, which,
except in very rare instances, would be an utter impossibility.
even though the fact of negligence might exist. It would be
better far to inform him he is without relief, than to deceive him
with a remedy like this.
To admit such interruptions of the liability of the carrier
would make clear the way for the grossest frauds and imposition,
with no means of protection and no power of discovery on the
part of the owner. He is always absent. He does not go with
his goods, and cannot be permitted to do so. He must trust them
absolutely and exclusively to the keeping of the carrier. Whether
they were lost or destroyed when in motion or on the way, or
while in a warehouse, he could not tell, and it would generally be
a secret past his finding out. He would be wholly in the power
and at the mercy of the carrier, and if the carrier said they
were destroyed in a burning warehouse or depot, he must abandon all claim. This would be placing too great power in the
hands as well as too great temptations in the way of carriers.
"It is well settled in this state," says Mr. Commissioner EARL
in delivering the opinion of the commission of appeals in Fenner
v. Railroad Company, 44 New York 505, "that an intermediate carrier, one who receives goods to be transported over
his route, and thence by other carriers to their place of destination, generally remains liable as a common carrier until he has
delivered the goods to the next carrier. It was deemed wise
policy that the principl, of the common law should be so expounded and applied, that the liability of one carrier should
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continue until that of the next carrier commenced." The learned
commissioner cites Miller v. Steam Navigation Co., 10 N. Y.
431; Gould v. COapin, 20 Id. 266; a .Due v. Griffith, 25 Id.
364, and fe.Donald v. TWestern Railroad Gorporation, 34 Id.
497, and then proceeds with a quotation of the language of Chief
Justice JOHNSON in Gould v. Chapin as follows: "No owner
can be supposed to have an agent to superintend such transhipment of his goods, in the course of a long line of transportation ;
and if the responsibility of each carrier is not continued until
delivery in fact to the next carrier, or at least until the first
carrier, by some act clearly indicating his purpose, terminates his
relation as carrier, we shall greatly diminish the security and
convenience of those whose property is necessarily abandoned to
others, with no safeguards save those which the rules of law
afford."
And next the commissioner quotes the language of Judge
SMITH in MZicDonald v. The Western Railroad Corporation,which
is this: "The owner loses sight of his goods when he delivers
them to the first carrier, and has no means of learning their
whereabouts till he or the consignee is informed of their arrival
at the place of destination. At each successive point of transfer
from one carrier to another, they are liable to be placed in warehouses, there, perhaps, to be delayed by the accumulation of freight.
or other causes, and exposed to loss by fire or theft, without fault
on the part of the carrier or his agents. Superadded to these
risks, are the dangers of loss by collision, quite as imminent while
the goods are thus stored at some point unknown to the owner as
while they are in actual transit. As a general rule, the storing
under such circumstances should be held to be a mere accessory
to the transportation, and the goods should be under the protection of the rule wbich makes the carrier liable, as an insurer,
from the time the owner transfers their possession to the first
carrier till they are delivered at the end of the route."
And here it occurs to me to observe that among the great
number of such cases which have arisen and been adjudicated by
the courts of New York, not one has yet been presented where
the intermediate carrier has been exonerated from liability as a
carrier for goods lost or destroyed while in store or on deposit by
such carrier. The case of 31ills v. Railroad Company, 45 N.
Y. 672, cited by counsel for the plaintiff in this action, would
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seem to have been a pretty strong one for declaring an exception,
but yet the court refuses. The case of an adjudicated exception
is yet to come, for thus far the doctrine rests upon mere suggestions or hints, vaguely thrown out, and nothing more.
And the case of .Nashua Sack Company v. Bailroad Company,
48 N. H. 339, is a most elaborate and powerfully reasoned one,
nany of the arguments and views of which very strongly favor
my conclusion. It contains a review and examination of most
of the leading authorities, English and American, and a statement
of the doctrines of the courts on both sides of the Atlantic. I
must say that I think Mr. Chief Justice PERLEY performed a.
very great and valuable service, both for the profession and for
the law, when he wrote that opinion.
And the case of Baxter v. WhTeeler, 49 N. H. 6, is another
case most elaborately and well considered, as is the manner of
that court, which also favors my views. I need only refer to these
two last cases for a full and ample vindication of the principles
by which I think the present one ought to be governed.
In England the question presented in this case has never to my
knowledge been considered, since under the rule in fuisctamp's
Oase, 8 M. & W. 421, it could not well arise. The first carrier
there is liable as such, for the safety of the goods throughout
the transit and until they are delivered at the place of destination, which is of course a sufficient protection of the rights of the
owner or consignee. The English rule has also, I believe, been
applied in Illinois.
Now in the present case, I think the law should hold the carrier
in whose possession the goods were destroyed, responsible to the
owner or consignee for their value as a carrier or insurer of the
goods, leaving such carrier to seek his remedy against the next
carrier in the route or line of transit, in case it was the fault of
the latter that the goods were not removed in due time as regulated by the course of business and the usage and practice pre.
vailing among carriers. In this way the burden of settling those
hazardous and uncertain questions would be thrown upon the
carriers themselves, where it belongs. They are the parties who
know the facts, or have ample means of ascertaining what they
are. In this way also multiplicity of actions would be saved, for
as between the carriers themselves the controversy could be settled
in one action. I have no doubt that upon the usage and custom
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above spoken of or upon the implied contract or obligation growing out of it, one carrier may maintain his action against aliother
under such circumstances.
As I have limited the rule which I regard as the true one, to
ordinary cases, or those arising under ordinary circumstances, it
may be proper, perhaps, that I should suggest what would seem
to me to be an extraordinary one. I should say that in a case
of a break or interruption in the line of transit or communication, as by storm,.flood or earthquake, or by fact of war, rendering it impossible to send the goods forward or making considerable
delay in the transportation necessary, the carrier might store the
goods, and at once give notice to the consignee or owner, and
thus absolve himself from liability as a carrier. Other cases of
an extraordinary nature might also occur ; I only suggest these.
I think the judgment should be affirmed.
COLE, J.-I
concur with the Chief Justice in the rule of law
which gives the owner or consignee the continuous liability of a
common carrier while the goods are in transit, and that the judgment must be affirmed.

LYON, J.-I concur in the affirmance of the judgment of the
Circuit Court, but am inclined to adhere to thd doctrine asserted
in the case of Wood v. The Iiluw.
&
t. Pet.Bailway Co., 27 Wis.
541.
The foregoing case is one of interest
to the public and to business men connected with railway transportation, inasmuch as it shows the pressure which
ill~advised rules, affecting railway traffic,
must sooner or later, bring upon the
courts, in regard to transactions constantly occurring in that business, and
not always sufficiently provided for in the
earlier decisions. The rule declared in
Schneider v. Evans, 25 Wis. 241, s. a.
9 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 536, is the one
virtually followed in Wood v. The Milw.
6"St. Pet. Railway, 27 Wis. 541, allowing each carrier in a connected line of
transportation to stand, precisely as if
there were no business connection between the different carriers, and which
the court now justly repudiate on ac-

count of its impracticability. We objected to the rule, in our note to Schneider v. Evans, when the case appeared in
the Register, on account of the impolicy
and injustice of allowing the last carrier,
in a continuous line, to repudiate the
contract of the first carrier, in regard to
the amount of the entire freight, and
to turn over the owner to seek his redress of the party with whom he made his
contract. The court have now overruled
the case of Wood v. The Railwayj, supra,
upon the ground that it is turning over
the owner to hunt for redress, in a
matter which the carriers ought to arrange among themselves ; the very
ground of our objection to the decision
in Schneider v. Evans; and we cannot
comprehend why the objection is not a
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valid one against both decisions. We
are glad the court have had the manliness to review this ground, and to place
the matter on the true ground, which, if
we understand it fully, comes virtually
to this, that so long as different railway
companies keep up a continuous line of
transportation, and all the companies
are constantly in the practice of accepting freight for transportation over the
other lines, and this is done with the
Itnowledge and assent of all the connecting companies, each must be held
to be the authorized agent of the others,
and his contracts on their behalf will
bind them. And further, so long as
these companies hold themselves out as
such continuous line, and accept goods
to pass in their transit, from the line of
one company to the other, they must
arrange the transmission of the same,
from one company to the other, among
themselves ; so that the owner shall
have the responsibility of a continuous
succession of common carriers. It is, no
doubt, the true policy of the law to afford
this security to the *ublic as far as
practicable, without too great departure
from established precedents.
The great question will always be in
putting goods into warehouses by carriers, as to the after responsibility,
whether this warehousing is done for
he convenience of the carrier, as a
necessary or convenient part of the
transportation, or is done merely for the
sent ity of the owner, . 'icr the carrier's
duty has terminated. Under the former
modes of transportation, in wagons, and
when there wereno business.connections
between the different lines, it often happened that considerable time elapsed between the arrival of goods on one line and
the departure upon another upon which
they were to go. In such cases it was
natural and just to treat the first carrier,
after his duty, as carrier, had terminated,
to act as tile agent of the owner for the
purposc of forwarding the goods by
another destined line, and to treat the

warehousing, at such intermediate point
as "not for the convenience of the
carriers, but of the owner of the goods,"
in the language of BULLER, J., in Garside v. Treat J- Mersey Nov. Co., 4 T.
R. 583. But under the present arrangements in railway transportation, there is
no occasion for any delay in passing
goods from the line of one company to
that of another upon a continuous route,
unless it be for the convenience of the
carriers, and in such cases it has always
been held the carrier is responsible, as
carrier, and not as mere warehouseman
or forwarler. There is no conflict in
the cases that the common carrier, who
receives goods for immediate transportation, is responsible, as carrier, from the
time he receives the goods. And he will
be held responsible as carrier, while lie
keeps them in warehouse, for his own
convenience: Moses v. Boston 4- Maine
Ry., 32 N. H. 523; a. c. 2 Redf. Am.
Railway Cases 165 ; Clarke v. Needles,
25 Penn. St. 338 ; Blossom v. Griffin,
3 Krernan 569 ; Stewart v. Bremer, 63
Penn. St. 268.
But when the first carrier is once
charged with the custody of the goods to
pass over a continuous line, his respulnsibility will continue, until he discha-ges
himself by placing the goods in the
actual, or constructive, custody of the
next carrier; in other words, until lie
charges the next carrier: Maybi, v. S.
C. Ry., 8 Rich. 240 ; Barter v. lV'eeler,
49 N. 11. 9 ; ,cLaren v. D. 6- 11. Ri'.,
23 Wisconsin 138; Teal v. Sears, 9 Barb.
317; Loc4 Co. v. Woe. 6- Xisiha R/.,
48 N. 11. 339 ; s. c. 10 Am. Law. Reg.
N. S. 244 ; 2 Redf. Am. Railway Cacs
290. Tile cases are very numerous hearing in this general direction, and need
not be fnrther cited. The case of lMood
v. The Railway, 27 Wis. 541, which is
so severely handled, both by court and
counsel, in the principal ease, does not
seem to us specially faulty, except in
making the next carrier the agent of the
owner to effect the delivery to himself.
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The true view unquestionably is, that the
law casts a public duty upon carriers, in
a continuous line, to effect the transfer
from each preceding to the succeeding
lne, in the shortest reasonable time, and
holds the firstearrier responsible as such,
until this is effected ; and so on throughout the line. It is therefore the duty of
each preceding carrier to place the goods,
immediately upon their arrival at the
end of his route, in the custody of the
next carrier, or at least to so tender
them to such carrier as to secure a
refusal to accept, which may render the
recond carrier responsible for the safety
of the goods or for all loss or damage
resulting from his refusal to accept them.
We are not so sanguine as some, in
regard to courts being able to discover
such rules of law in regard to the duties
of carriers, as to eliminate all uncertainties, and thus render the administration of the law hereafter a matter of
plain sailing. This has been attempted
a great many times, in regard to different subjects in the law, in the last

two hundred years, and we are not sure,
that the uncertainties of the !aw have
essentially diminished in that time, but
it is no doubt the duty of courts to adopt
rules as easy and certain in their application as possible; but without departing from the true principles of legal
justice. If certainty is sought, at the
expense of principle, it will be found to
have been obtained at too dear a rate.
We do not object to the rule laid down
in the principal case. It is substantially
the same for which we have always contended ; that a " continuous liability of
carriers should be kept up throughout
the line, which it seems to us is the true
policy of the law on this subject:" 2
Railv. 75, p. 175, pl. 13. But we may
be allowed to say, that we always feel
some alarm, when we find any rule of
law attacked mainly upon the ground
of its uncertainty and the difficulty of its
application. We regard it as a threat.
ened invasion of established prineples.
for the sake of convenience.
I. F. R.
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BEAN, ASSIGNEE, v. AMSINK

ET AL.

Where a composition is made by creditors with a debtor, any securiiv or advantage given to a particular creditor, not provided for in the terms of the composition and not disclosed, is void, both as to the other creditors and as to the
debtor.
Creditors agreed to accept 70 per cent. in notes, payable at six, twelve and
eighteen months. One of the creditors, in pursuance of a previous agreement,
gave back the notes for the 70 per cent. and took notes for 50 per cent. payable in
60 days. These notes were paid but the debtor being unable to meet the sixmonth notes, was adjudicated a bankrupt. Held, that his assignee could recover
back the money paid to the creditor on the sixty-day notes.

THIS was a bill in equity by the assignee in bankruptcy of
Kintzing & Co., to recover back money paid defendants in fraud
of a composition deed.

In February 1869 Kintzing & Co., of St. Louis, Mo., having
become embarrassed, presented to their creditors a composition
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deed by which the latter agreed to accept seventy per cent. of
their claims, payable in equal instalments at six, twelve and
eighteen months, and to be evidenced by the debtors' notes at
those times. The deed was not to be binding on any one unless
signed by all the creditors. Defendants, who were the largest
creditors, made an agreement with Kintzing that the latter would
after the deed was signed, discount his seventy per cent. notes by
paying fifty per cent. of the debt, one-third in cash, and the remainder in two notes at thirty and sixty days. Defendants also
stipulated that they should not sign until after all the other
creditors had done so. After the deed had been signed by a very
large majority of the creditors both in number and amount, but
not by all, defendants through their agents Reuss & Co., signed
it ; no other creditor signed after defendants ; and the agrecemnt
was carried out between defendants and Kintzing. Defendants'
notes were paid in April and May 1869, but when the first of
the composition notes came due in August 1869 Kintzing was
unable to meet them, and on August 21st he made an assignment
under the laws of Missouri, for the benefit of all his creditors.
Subsequently an adjudication of bankruptcy was made and an
assignment to the present plaintiff of all the estate which Kintzing
had on the 17th day of September 1869. The assignee brought
this suit to recover.the money paid by Kintzing to defendants.
Edward B. Aferrill, for plaintiff.
Augustus Z Smith, for defendants.
BLATCOFOID, J., after stating the facts in detail.-The answer
denies that an agreement was made which was fraudulent, or
made with an intent, on the part of the defendants, to deceive or
cheat the other creditors of Kintzing, or with a view on their part
to obtain a fraudulent preference over the said other creditors.
It admits that subsequently to the 15th of February 1869, Reuss
& Co., by the authority of the defendants, signed, in the firm
name of the defendants, the compromise agreement. It denies
that any money paid to the defendants vested in the plaintiff; it
avers that the defendants received the payments believing, after
the compromise agreement was signed, that Charles S. Kintzing
& Co. were solvent and able to pay all their then debts; that
the other creditors also so believed ; that, in consideration of the
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payments, they discharged Charles S. Kintzing & Co. from all
liability, 'hich, under the compromise agreement, amounted to
$22,786.15; that the transaction can in no aspect be questioned
by the plaintiff in consequence of its being contrary to public
policy in respect to its infringement of the terms of the compromise agreement; that, at the time of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy, Lindsley was a partner of Kintzing, under the
firm name of Charles S. Kintzing & Co., and the debts claimed
by the creditors .by whom said petition was filed were contracted
by said firm, so composed, the members of which were, both of
them, liable, as such partners, to said creditors on said debts, at
the time the petition was filed and afterwards; that Lindsley was
not made a party to the bankruptcy proceedings, or adjudged
bankrupt, although he was alive and resided in the United States;
that, therefore, the court in Missouri never acquired jurisdiction
of the proceedings so as to adjudge Kintzing to be bankrupt, and
that the plaintiff, by his appointment as assignee, never acquired
any title to any of the estate of said firm of Charles S. Kintzing
& Co., or to the claim or cause of action set forth in the bill.
The principle upon which the plaintiff seeks a recovery in this
case is well settled. Such a transaction as that in which the defendants engaged was a constructive fraud on the other creditors.
Those who entered into the composition agreed, by its terms, to
.accept the seventy per cent. in full payment and satisfaction of
their claims, relying on the statement which had been exhibited
to them of the books, assets, and effects of their debtors, and, in
substance, constituting Kintzing their trustee, to take such assets
and effects, and settle up the business, by applying such assets
and effects to the payment of the compromise notes. Such an
arrangement was necessarily based on the good faith of all the
creditors entering into the composition, in their dealings with the
debtors and with each other, and there could be no good faith,
either towards the debtors or towards the other creditors, when
one creditor obtained, by a secret arrangement with the debtors,
which amounted to coercion and duress upon the debtors, the
advantage of an early, certain, cash payment of one-half of his
detW which resulting in making the debtors unable to pay to the
other creditors any part of the seventy per cent. for which they
bargained. They supposed the favored creditors were acting in
good faith, in agreeing to the same terms they agreed to,
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whereas, it turns out, that such favored creditors had been bribed
to hold themselves out as agreeing to such terms. Secret agreements of that kind are held void, both by courts of law and
courts of equity, and are not enforced, even against the assenting debtor, or his sureties, or his friends. Public policy, and the
interests of unsuspecting and deceived creditors, forbid the enforcement of such secret agreements. And it makes no differerce whether threats or oppression were used to induce the debtor
to consent to the secret agreement, or whhther he was merely a
volunteer, offering his services, and aiding in the intended deception: 1 Story's Eq. Juris., sees. 378, 379, and cases there cited;
Clarke v. White, 12 Peters 178, 199; May on Fraudulent Conveyances 86, and cases there cited; Russell v. Rogers, 10
Wendell 473, 479; Viggi v. Bush, 12 Johnson 306, 309; Bean
v. Brookrmire, 1 Dillon 151, 154; Dandgleish v. Tennent, Law
Rep. 2 Q. B. 48, 54. Not only are such secret agreements not
enforced, but money paid under them is allowed to be recovered
back by the debtor, as having been obtained in violation of the
principle of public policy, and affirmative relief is given to the
debtor against such agreements, even where they are not forbidden by an express statute: Smith v. Bromley, Doug. R. 696,
note; Jackrman v. 111itchell, 13 Vesey 581; Wood v. Barker,
Law Rep. 1 Eq. Cases 139. Nor is it material whether the
secret agreement gives to the favored creditor a larger sum, or
an additional security or advantage: Eastabrook v. Scott, 3
Vesey 456; Gonstantien v. Blache, 1 Cox's Oh. Cases 287. The
case of Cullingworth v. Loyd, 2 Beavan 385, shows that, although there is no general meeting of creditors, nor any agreeminet entered into by the creditors generally, yet, if a proposition
is made to the creditors at large to pay them all a composition on
certain terms, no creditor can ostensibly accept such composition
and sign the deed which expresses his acceptance of the terms,
and at the same time stipulate for or secure to himself a peculiar
anrl separate advantage which is not expressed upon the deed.
I:. Leicester v. Rose, 4 East 372. 383, it is said that the fraud
in such a case may consist in putting the favored creditor in a
bct(r situation than the other creditors; that it is not necessary
lie should stipulate to receive more money than the others, but
the fraud may consist in receiving that which is meant to procure
him more money, namely, a better security for the same sum -
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and that it is a fraud on the creditors at large for a person to
hold out that he will come in under the general agreement, by
signing the deed when presented to him separately, and then to
stipulate for a further partial benefit to himself.
The leading cases on the subject are reviewed in Breck v. Cole,
4 Sandf. S. 0. R. 79, and the conclusion is thus stated: "It is
the clear and inevitable result of the decisions that, where a composition is made with creditors, every security given to a particular
creditor, not provided for in the terms of the deed, and not disclosed, is void, as a fraud upon the creditors from whom it is
concealed, and, where it is taken from the debtor himself, as a
condition of his discharge, is void, upon the ground of duress as
well as of fraud." It is also said in that case, "that it makes
no difference that the secret agreement does not have, and cannot
have, the effect of depriving the other creditors of any portion
of the amounts they had agreed to receive; that it is sufficient,
if a fact is concealed which it was material for them to know,
and the knowledge of which might have prevented them from
assenting to the composition; and that, upon a composition deed,
all the parties are supposed to stand in the same situation, and
if there is any one who refuses to do so, he must announce it at
the time, it being impossible to say that those who signed the
deed in the confidence that, under it, the rights of all would be
equal, would have signed it at all if it had been known to them
that a better security was to be given to any one creditor than
that which, by the terms of the deed, all had consented to take."
These views are approved by Judge WOODRUFF, in Carrol v.
Shields, 4 E. D. Smith 466. The case of Pinneo v. Higgins, 12
Abb. Pr. Rep. 334, is very much like the present one. There
the favored creditor held out to the debtor that he would unite in
the composition if the other creditors did; when all the other
creditors had signed, he sought to obtain better terms, and then
agreed to sign if those terms were complied with, and finally did
sign because they were complied with. In that case, it was urged
that no creditor was induced to sign because the favored creditor
had signed. But the court held that "it was of no consequence
whether the name of the favored creditor was the first that was
oigned to the composition agreement, or the last; that he, by
signing, entered into an agreement with the other creditors, as
well as with the debtor, and that the separate agreement was
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equally void, whether made after all the other creditors had
signed, or whether before or after the creditor who made it had
signed."
It is contended, for the defendants, that the present case does
not fall within the principles thus settled, because it was expressly
provided in the composition agreement, that it was not to be
binding on any one unless agreed to and signed by all the creditors, and it was not signed by all the creditors; and, because the
defendants bargained for fifty per cent. only of their claim, and
threw away twenty per cent. of it; and because Reuss & Co.
were authorized to sign only after all the other creditors had
signed, and there were creditors who did not sign at all, and su.h
condition was not waived either by Reuss & Co. or by the defendants. The ground taken is that, as the composition agreement
never had any binding force, as against the defendants, the payment to them of fifty per cent. of their debt did not violate any
rights of the other creditors under the compromise. The difficulty with this view is, that it overlooks the true relations of the
defendants to the other creditors. The defendants and Reuss &
Co. supposed, as is evident from the letter of the 16th of March
1869, from the latter to the former, that all the other creditors
had signed. They, therefore, acted on that view in taking the
fifty per cent. and pretending to assent to the compromise terms,
and concealing from the other creditors the special arrangement.
So, too, the other creditors, inasmuch as the deed, by its terms.
provided that all the creditors must sign before the composition
should be binding, had the right to suppose, in receiving their
composition notes, that all the creditors had signed, and that all
were to receive like notes, and nothing further. They acted on
that view in taking their notes. Hence, not only must the agree.
ment, for the purpose of this case, be regarded as haying been
signed by all the creditors, but each creditor has a right to stand
as if the defendants had- signed before him. Nor does it make
any difference that there may not, in fact, have been any manual
tradition of the compromise notes to Reuss & Co. or to the
defendants. The letter of the 8th of March 1869, from the
defendants to Reuss & Co. states expressly that the fifty per cent
is to be received as a "1discount" of the compromise notes, and
that those notes are to be discounted on the signing of the agreement by Reuss & Co. Therefore, the signing the receipt of the
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compromise notes, and their "discount,"

were to be simultaneous

acts. And the defendants, having accepted the "1discount," and
retained it under that arrangement, are estopped from saying that
the compromise notes were not received by them, or that Reuss
& Co. had no authority to sign the agreement, or that it was not
binding because all the creditors did not sign it. The defendants
did not treat separately in respect of their debt, but as a part of
the general creditors, all of whom were, as they knew, to be invited to accede to the same terms.
Nor is there any force in the fact that the defendants obtained
only fifty per cent. of their claim instead of seventy per cent.
By obtaining the fifty per cent. they substantially exhausted a
large part of the resources of the debtors. They intended to
make it sure that they should obtain the whole of their fifty per
cent. before any of the compromise notes, which the other creditors were to receive, should fall due, and they further intended
to make it sure, by signing last, that no creditor should be left
free to proceed against the debtors on his original claim, so as to
prevent the payment of the whole of the fifty per cent. It is to
be assumed that other creditors would have preferred such an
arrangement as the defendants made. At all events, it is to be
assumed that others who signed would not have signed had they
known of the private arrangement with the defendants, which
was to strip the debtors of a large part of their means for paying
the six months' compromise notes. The amount of such notes
actually given was $24,768.89.
The amount of the defendants'
first compromise note, at seventy per cent., would have been
$7595.38. Before half of the six months had elapsed the deThe position
fendants had exacted from the debtors $16,275.83.
of the creditors who have been defrauded by the private agreement would have been no different from what it is if all the crelitors had signed the compromise agreement; or if, all signing it,
the defendants had not signed last; or if, only a part signing it.
including the defendants, the defendants had not signed last; such
position, too, is the same as it would have been if, all the creditors
signing the compromise agreement, the defendants had signed it
first; or, only a part signing it, including the defendants, the
defendants had signed it first.
The suggestion that, if the compromise at seventy cents had
bnen carried out, Kintzing & Co. were solvent, has no force, ex
Vol. XXI.-25
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cept to show that the defendants rendered it, through their
fraud, impossible that the compromise should be carried out.
It being clear, therefore, that the transaction was a fraud on
the creditors, the right of the plaintiff to receive back the moae)y
for such creditors is equally clear, whether the money could or
could not be recovered back by the debtor. The fourteenth
section of the Bankruptcy Act especially vests in the assignee all
property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors, and
authorizes him to sue for and recover the same. This applies to
conveyances fraudulent at common law, and to transfers of property, such as that in the present case: Knowlton v. 2foseh,
105 Mass., 136; Bean v. Brookmire, 1 Dillon 151, 154. It is
contended that the bankruptcy proceedings were against Kintzing
alone, and not against Lindsley also, and not against the firm;
that the plaintiff is the assignee only of Kintzing, individually,
and not of the assets of the firm; that the copartnership was
never dissolved ; that the plaintiff does not represent the interest
of Lindsley in the claim sought to be recovered in this suit; and
that Lindsley has an interest in it, which did not pass to the
plaintiff. It is apparent, from the evidence, that the firm was
regarded as dissolved by all parties concerned-by Kintzing, by
Lindsley, and by the creditors, including the defendants--and
that the assets and the effects of the firm were regarded as being
put into Kintzing's hands, in trust, to settle up the business, as
the appointee of the creditors, and pay the compromise notes.
ittzing passed into the hands of the state assignee all that was
left of such assets, as being part of the estate of Kint:din.g. From
the state assignee they passed to the plaintiff as thi,.signee of
Kintzing, as part of the estate of Kintzing. But there is another
view of the matter. The composition deed does not appear to
have been assented to in any manner by Lindsley. ie is net
tamed in it, nor was he, so far as appears, a party to it, potentially. The deed is made between " Charles S. Kintzing & Co."
and his creditors. There does not seem to have been any authority, so far as Lindsley was concerned, to sign t116 firm name to
the compromise notes, so as to bind him by them. The compromise notes, therefore, signed by Kintzlng with the firm name,
were the individual notes of Kintzing. Having given them, he
was to have the assets to administer, with which to pay them.
This was the view of the creditors and of t!he Bankruptcy Court.
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The petition states that the petitioners are creditors of Kintzing,
a member of the late firm, and that his debts to them are two of
those six months' compromise notes, signed in the name of Charles
S. Kintzing & Co., but given by Kintzing, and that he committed
all of the alleged acts of bankruptcy, one among them being the
preferential payment by him to the defendants, as creditors of
his, of the moneys before mentioned. And the prayer of the
petition is that Kintzing, so doing business as Charles S. Kintzing & Co., may be declared bankrupt. The defendants, as
before shown, having really accepted the compromise notes and
received the fifty per cent. as a discount of those notes, as well
as all the other compromise notes, being really only the individual
notes of Kintzing, and it appearing that the moneys paid to the
defendants were paid by Kintzing out of the general funds of
Kintzing, it follows that although those funds may have been, in
part, the proceeds of the assets of the former firm, and although
it may appear, on a calculation, that Kintzing was a debtor to
such former firm in respect to the assets he received and converted
into money to an amount sufficient to cover the payments to the
defendants, yet the claim sought to be recovered in this suit, is a
claim belonging to the estate of Kintzing, and recoverable by
the plaintiff as his assignee. How the plaintiff shall distribute
the amount of the recovery under the direction of the Bankruptcy
Court, as between persons who were creditors of the former firm
(including those who received, and those who did not receive
compromise notes), and persons who, through creditors of Kintzing, were never creditors of the former firm, is a question not
involved in this suit.
There must be a decree for the plaintiff for the several amounts
of money paid to the defendants, with interest and costs.
The foregoing case does not seem to
involve any new principle of law, or any
of very difficult application. And still
it cannot fail to move the decided approbaticn, if not the admiration, of all lovers
of simple, straightforward justice. We
know, indeed, that even that kind of
ju.-tice may be reached at too great expense, when the established principles of
the law are even apparentiy set aside, or
treated with a sort of ill-disguised defiance or contempt.
It is important,

perhaps indispensable, in order to maintain a salutary respect for the ourts.
without which it soon becomes impossible
to maintain order in society, except by
the bayonet, that their decisions should
rest upon recognised principles of law as
well as justice, and should not appear to
disregard the force of established precedents, for any cause, however high or
holy. Hence it becomes important that
thejudges should possess such familiarity
with the jurisprudence of the country,
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that their judgments will appear to rest
upon well recognised judicial convictions rather than upon mere bald instincts, however pure or patriotic. The
judge, in order to command the willing
acquiescence of all, should appear to act
from tme nceessary compulsion of established principles, rather than from any
personal and private speculations, however wise or far-seeing. We are not sure,
that the present case calls for tie application of this rule to any great extent, or
indeed in any sense whatever. But, on
first impression, it would not be wonderful
if some shouhl consider that it had carried the principle upon which it professes
to go, somewhat further than the former
cases. This impression, weappreliend, if
it exist anywhere, will appear, upon carefill review of the former decisions, to be
without any just foundation. The apparent discrcpancy, if any, will e found
to result from what we have before had
ocecaion to regret, in or notes to cases,
that the reasons assigned for forming the
,;vcisions, had reference too exclusively
to lie facts in tie particular case, and
did not sufi,.ietly bring out the general
principles upn which the entire class of
case- proceeds. That is eminently true
of the best writers and the most cautious
jiviges, in discussing the grounds upon
which frauds upon composition with creditors may le committed. A considerahle munber of judges and writers seem
to imply, that the fraud consists mainly
in violating the confidence upon which
the particular creditor had influenced
ether creditors to c,nie into the arrange,ent. Mr. Justice STORY, 1 Eq. Jur.
? 378, seems to place the enormity of the
fraud upon the fact of having " thus decaved other innocent and unsuspecting
creditors into signing deeds of composition." * * * " The very circumstance
that other creditors, of known reputation
,i?.d standing, hane ah'ca(dy become lrties
to the deed, will operate as a strong in.,lu,.ment to 3thers to act in th~e same
way."
So also many of the cases upon

this subject seem to rest upon the same
view: Fzvweat v. Gee, 3 Anst. 910 ;
ills v. Guling, 1 B. & B. 447 ; Leicester v. Rose, 4 East 372 ; Cullingw'loth
v. Lloyd, 2 Beav. 385 ; Wood v. Roberts,
2 Stark. 417.
But a full examination of the decided
cases will show, very clearly, that the
gist of the fraud, in this class of cases,
does not consist mainly in the deceptive
inducement held out to other creditors to
enter into the composition. For it has
been held that while any secret agreement by which one creditor obtains additional security, although for no greater
sum than the others, is void, Ex parte
Sadler 4- Jackson, 15 Ves. 52 ; this will
be equally so, although made after the
creditors had executed the deed of comnposition : J1lawson v. Stock, 6 Ves. 300 ;
Jackman v, Jitchell, 13 ld. 581. And it
will have the same effect, that the additional sum is paid by the friends of the
debtor, without his knowledge, and the
money may be recovered back by the
debtor, if compelled to pay it by any
transfer of the securities to bond idc
holders : Bradshaw v. Brad.haw. 9 111 &
W. 29 ; Turner v. Hoole, D. & R. N. P.
'C. 27; Smith v. cuff, 6 M. & S. 160.
And not only the additional security
will be held void at law, but the creditor
who takes it will be enjoined in a court
of equity from bringing suit upon it:
Constantine v. Bloche, 1 Cox 287. And
not only this, but the taking of such security avoids the whole compromise, as
to such creditor, and lie cannot ieccsr
upon the securities rightfully given under
the conpromise, even when he has not
obtained the amount in any other manner: I1,wden v. Iriqh, :I Ad. & Ellis
1033; Kij"iht v. Huant, 5 Bing. 432.
And even when a particular creditor had
fairly obtained a preceding security for
part of his debt, lie cannot retain this.
or accept one in lieu of it. in addition
to what the other creditors obtain under
the compromise, uuless lie make it
known to the other creditors, at the
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time, and they assent: Cullingworth v.
Lloyd, 2 Beavan 385 ; Leicester v. Rose,
4 East 372 ; Coleman v. Waller, 3 Y. &
J 212. And it has been held that the
assignee in bankruptcy may recover back
any additional sum so secretly taken by
any creditor, although the stipulated
compromise has not been carried into
effect by payment of the money: Alsager v. Spalding, 4 Bing. N. C. 407.
And it has been held that courts of
equity will decree the surrender of securities, so obtained, even upon bills on
behalf ofpat ticipes criminison the ground
of public policy : Auorney-General v.
Griffith, 13 Ves. 565. And this seems to
point to the true ground upon which
redress is afforded by courts of equity in
this class of cases. It is a species of
fraud, in violation of very special confidence and trust, and where there is
very exceptional temptation and opportunity for committing such fraud, and
therefore the greater necessity of stringent demands for the utmost good faith,
the'uberrimafidesof the civil law. Much
the same demands are made by courts
of equity in cases of suretyship, and by
all courts in matters of insurance. And
this partakes partly of the nature both
of suretyship and of insurance.
There are many grounds upon which
a composition with creditors may be
said to be avoided, by one of the creditors departing from the terms of the
arrangement and obtaining different
terms for himself, which we may safely
suppose he regards as better terms than
those furnished by the agreed compromise.
I. It may be upon the ground that the
basis of the composition did not present
the whole truth of the debtor's meanseither that he had more ability to pay
than he disclosed; in which case the
compromise would be invalid because
obtained by false representation, and thus
justify the creditors suing for their whole
debts; Reynolds v. French, 8 Vt. 85 ;
or that lie had less than he represented,

so that by obtaining better security, or
payment in advance, the creditor would,
as in the present case, deprive the other
creditors of their equal share in the
assets, which would defeat the composition in another essential particular.
2. If there is any guaranty by third
parties, of the sums agreed to be paid under the composition, the secret drawing
off of the common fund relied upon to indemnify the sureties, whether in a larger
amount or at an earlier day than the
stipulated arrangement, will operate as
such a fraud upon the sureties, as to avoid
the contract by which it is attempted.
The cases are numerous to this effect:
Pidcock v. Bishop, 3 B. & C. OC;
Kearsleyl v. Cole, 16 Law ,J. Exch. 115 ;
Calvert v. London Dock Co , 2 Keen 338.
3. Where the creditors, as is tile more
common case, rely upon the debtor's
assets, placed in his hands or that of some
other as trustee, to be disposed of to
meet the terms of the composition, the
attempt of one creditor to obtain more
than his just share, or in a different
mode, is a fraud upon the trust and a
diversion of the trust fund, when carried
into effect, and a court of equity will
either enjoin the attempt or restore the
fund when actually diverted.
In all these modes of departure from
the composition, there is fraud and breach
of trust or confidence, giving equity
jurisdiction, and the extent and nature
of the redress, no doubt, rest largely
upon principles of established public
policy, and the peculiarly confidestial
nature of the transaction, and the Absolute necessity of the utmost good faith
and fail dealing. The remedy under the
present bankrupt law would seem most
unquestionable. The provision of the
14th section seems to have been frhmed
for precisely such cases. The Anvrican
cases have followed the English, we
think, in all essential particulars, which
are sufficiently referred to in the foregoing opinion.
I. F. R.

MARSH v. F., P. & N. W. RAILWAY CO.

Supreme Court of -llinois.
JOHN L. MARSH v. TIHE FAIRBURT, PONTIAC AND NORTH
WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
Railroad companies are incorporated by authority of law, not for the promotion
of mere private ends, but in view of the public good they subserve.
The specific execution of a contract in equity, is a matter not of absolute right,
but of sound discretion in the court, and in deciding whether specific performance
should he enforced against a railway company, regard must be had to the interest:of the public.
The location of a depot has much to do with the accommodation of the public,
and a court of equity will not compel a railroad company to permanently locatu
its depot at a particular spot, in order to subserve the private advantage of aa
individual.

Tins was a bill filed in the court below to enforce the specific
performance of a contract entered into by the Fairbury, Pontiac
and Northt-Western Railway to locate their passenger and freight
depot at a certain point in Fairbury and at no other place.
There was a demurrer to the bill which was sustained by the
court, and the bill dismissed. The complainant appealed.
A. -E. Harding, for appellant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SIIELDON, J.-This was a bill in chancery filed to enforce the
specific performance of a contract made by the Fairbury, Pontiac
and North-Western Railway Company "to locate passenger and
freight depots of said road in Marsh's addition to Fairbury and at
The court below sustained a demur,o other point in said town."
rer to the bill, and dismissed it. This is not a case which concerns
merely the private interests of two suitors. It is a matter where
the public interest is involved. Railroad companies are incorporated by authority of law not for the promotion of mere private
ends, but in view of the public good they subserve. It is the circumstatice of public use which justifies the exercise on their behalf
of the right of eminent domain in the taking of private property
for the purpose of their construction. They have come to be almost
a public necessity, the general welfare being largely dependent
upon these modes of inter-communication and the manner of carryng on their operations. The specific execution of a contract in
,!quity, is a matter not of absolute right in the party, but of sound
discretion in the court, and in deciding whether specific perform-
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ance should be enforced against a railway company, the court must
have regard to the interests of the public: Raphael v. Railway
Co., Law Rep. 2 Eq. Oases 37. The location of railroad depots
has much to do with the accommodation of the wants of the public.
And when once established, a change of affairs may require a
change of location in order to suit public convenience. We cannot
admit that an individual is entitled to call for the interference of
a court of equity to compel a railroad company to locate unchangeably its depot at a particular spot to subserve the private advantage of such individual. Railroad companies, in order to fulfil one
of the ends of their creation, the promotion of the public welfare,
should be left free to establish and re-establish their depots wheresoever the accommodation of the wants of the public may require.
To grant the relief asked for by the complainant we would regard
as against public policy, and he must be left for whatever remedy
he may have, to his suit at law for damages. The court below
properly sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the bill.
Decree affirmed.

Court of Chancery of New Jer8ey.
GRA.YDON'S EXECUTORS v. GRAYDON

ET AL.

Testator by his will authorized his executors at their discretion to sell his real
estate, and then directed them "to convert into money all the rest of his estate not
already in money or securities, and invest the same securely at interest" for the
support of his four children. The will further provided that if the testator's son
J. G. married the daughter of A. J. C. before a certain time, such son should
take no part or share in his estate, either principal or interest, and any provision
made for him is upon this condition. There was no residuary clause in the will.
The son married a daughter of A. J.C. before the time mentioned. On bill filec
to settle the construction of the will, held,
1. That as to the proceeds arising from the sale of the real estate, and as to the
money and other securities the testator died intestate, neither being included in
the clause directing the executors to invest part of his estate for the benefit of the
children, and there being no bequest or devise of any residue.
2. That shares in the capital stock of corporations must be sold by tLe executors,
such shares being.neither money nor securities.
3. That the restraint in regard to marriage was certain as to the individual, and
being a legal and valid condition made void all bequests to the son.
4. That the son was not entitled to claim any part of his father's estate, not ever
that as to which he died intestate.

This cause was argued upon bill, answer and proofs.
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Charles t. Vooritis, for complainants.
Knapp, for defendant, John Graydon.
ZABRISKIE, Chancellor.-The complainants are executors of the
will of Samuel Graydon, late of the county of Bergen. The object
of this suit is to settle the construction of the will, and direct the
complainants as to their duty in executing it.
The testator died on the 17th day of August 1869. By his
will, dated July 11th 1868, he authorized his executors at their
discretion, to sell his real estate. He directed them to convert
into money all his personal estate not already in money or securities, and invest the same securely at interest, and to apply so much
of the interest as should be necessary to the support of his children, until the youngest should be twenty-one. The great bulk of
his estate consisted of shares in corporations, and was therefore
included in this direction. When the youngest of his children
should "arrive at the age of twenty-one years, then the said principal to be divided between them, share and share alike, said child-"
ren being Caroline Graydon, John Graydon, Ida Graydon and
Samuel D. Graydon." The sum of $12,000 of John Graydon's
share, and a like sum of Samuel's share, is directed to be held at
interest, and the interest of the part of each paid to him during
his life, and at his death, to go to his issue. The whole shares of
the two daughters were to be in like manner kept at interest, the
interest during their lives paid to each respectively, and at her
death the principal to go to her issue when the youngest of said
issue shall arrive at the age of twenty-one.
The sixth clause provides as follows: " If my said children
shall die before a division of the property be made, under the foregoing provisions, leaving no lawful issue, then I give and bequeath
all the said rest of my estate, including said money and securities,
and real and personal estate of every kind and nature, to my
brothers." Besides this the will makes no disposition of testator's
real estate or money or securities for money, unless the eighth
clause is construed to dispose of them in the contingency there
provided for.
The eighth clause is in these words : "If my son John Graydon shall marry a daughter of A. J. Cameron, of Ridgewood,
Bergen county, New Jersey, prior to December 1st 1879, then my
will is, and I order that he take no part or share of my estate,
either principal or interest, and the provisions heretofore made for
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him are upon condition that he do not marry a daughter of said A. J.
Cameron before December 1st 1879. If he do, I hereby declare
such provision void and revoked. And in case my son John Graydon do marry a daughter of A. J. Cameron aforesaid, before
December 1st 1879, then I order my said executors to dispose of
my estate as if my son were dead in my lifetime intestate arid
without issue, but subject in other things to the provisions of this
my will."
John Graydon, on the 10th day of November 1869, married
Jessie Cameron, the daughter of Alexander J. Cameron of Ridgewood. They had entered into a mutual engagement of marriage
in February 1868. He then promised to marry her on his return
from California, where he was about to go, and from which he returned in September 1869, shortly after his father's death. He
knew the provisions of his father's will before the marriage.
The questions on which complainants ask for the direction of
the court are these:1. Whether t&P. directions to invest and pay over interest, include the proceeds of the real estate and the money and securities
for the money?
2. Whether shares in corporations are included in the exception
of securities, or whether they must be sold without regard to the
fact that the interest of the proceeds will be less than the dividend?
3. Whether the executors may permit the furniture and other
movable chattels to remain unsold for the use of the family?
4. Whether if the lands be sold the income should be paid to
the children ?
5. Whether the testator is intestate except as to the personal
estate which is not money or securities for money, and except a
legacy of $1000, which is given to Amanda Field, and an annuity
of $200 given fo his mother?
6. Whether John Graydon by his marriage is deprived of all
right to any part of his father's estate?
1. The will, after authorizing the executors to sell the real
estate and expressly leaving the sale to their discretion, directs
"all the rest of my estate not already in money or securities I
order my executors to convert into money and invest"-the words
"all. the rest," ex vi termini, exclude the real estate which he has
just provided for, and he expressly stated as to it, "I do not
order them to sell the same, I leave it to their best judgment."
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f'his is inconsistent with including it in the property which he
now orders to be converted into money.
2. Shares in the capital stock of corporations are neither money
,ior securities. They are simply the title of a shareholder to his
jroportion of the corporate property and its income. Bonds,
mortgages, notes, bills of exchange ad matters of like nature
lire securities for money-shares of capital stock are never called
recurities unless when made so by being pledged as collateraland here the testator could not have considered them as excepted
under the term securities, for without these there was not personal
property to produce $12,000, the sum which he directs 1o be invested for each of his sons out of his fourth of the proceeds.
Both the language of the will and the condition of his estate show
that he intended these shares to be converted into money and invested. The executors are bound to obey this direction of the
will. The wisdom of the direction is not for their consideration.
3. The testator having no wife, provided for his four children
by the interest of $12,000 for each of his sons, and by the larger
interest of her fourth share of the whole fund for each of his
daughters. lie made no provision for keeping up the mansion as
a home for his family. The executors should not allow the furniture and other movables to be used and worn out contrary to
the express directions of the testator.
4. The interest of the proceeds of the lands when sold is not
included in the directions of the fifth clause to apply interest to
the support of the children.
5. The only direct and positive dispositions made besides the
money legacy and the annuity are as to the proceeds of the persoil property directed to be converted into money. The money
and securities for money and the real estate or its proceeds are
not included in this disposition. The language of the fifth clause,
which contains the operative words of the bequest, is clear and
precise. After directing all the rest of his estate not already in
moiey or securities to be converted into money, and disposing of
the interest until the youngest child shall be twenty-one, it dihects
that "tlMen the said principal shall be divided between them share
and share alike," and all the other provisions except those in the
5th and Sth clauses relate to the shares of the four children in
this fund.
Phe only disposition of any rest or residue of his estate is that
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contained in that part of the eighth clause, which directs his executors in the case of John's marriage to A. J. Cameron's daughter,
to dispose of his estate as if John had died in his lifetime intestate
and without issue; but subject in other things to the provisions of
the will.
If John had died in testator's lifetime, the bequests to him would
have lapsed, and if there had been a residuary bequest, would have
fallen into the residue and been thus disposed of. But as there is
no residuary gift, the testator as to these lapsed bequests is intestate.
Had the principal of the fund been given to his children as joint
tenants, and John had died, the survivors would have taken the
whole. But the bequest to them "equally to be divided between
them share and share alike" made them tenants in dommon, and
the share on one dying would lapse. Had it been given to the
children by the name of children or as a class without naming them,
it would have gone to those who constitute that class at testator's
death or the time for division; but here they are enumerated by
name in the bequest, and the effect is the same as if it had been
given to each by name only. As to the share of John in the fund
arising from the conversion of personal estate into money, I am of
opinion that the testator also died intestate, except so far as the
words of the eighth clause exclude John from any part of it. It
must be equally divided among the three other children. The
words subject in other things to the provisions of this my will do
not apply to this lapsed share. He was speaking of his whole estate.
He had made certain provisions as to the shares of each child in the
fund directed to be invested, and only in regard to shares in that
fund. The general direction to dispose of his whole estate as if
John were dead in his lifetime, might without this saving clause
have been -construed to affect the shares of the others. These words
cannot be construed to extend these provisions further than they
are applied in the will. Nor can directions or limitations as to
John's share be applied to the issue of the other children. Indeed,
the words "in other respects" seem to exclude John's share from
this clause. That had just been declared forfeited, and was the only
thing to be distinguished and excluded by the word other.
The aboye conclusions are founded in the language used by the
testator, and are the only conclusions that can be arrived at consistent with that language, according to the rules adopted foi
construing language. There is nothing in any provision of any part
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of the will, or any intention expressed by the testator, to lead to a
different result or to cause any doubt as to this interpretation. Yet
as a matter of speculation, it is not difficult to suppose thLt the
testator intended to dispose of all of his property, and has failed to uze
words to express that intention. On the other hand, it is possible
that he intended to leave the proceeds of his real estate atid chattels,
and his money and securities, free from strict long limitation with
which le has tied up the special fund.
Ile freed the shares of his sons in that fund beyond $12,000 from
that limitation. When we look outside of the will for intention, and
use speculations and probabilities, to ascertain what a testator
intended and did not express, we repeal the Statute of Wills and pen
testaments by the imagination of the judge.
6. As to the right of John Graydon, it is urged that the person
whom John is not to marry is not designated with sufficient certainty. The words are, a daughter of A. J. Cameron of Ridgewood; besides Alexander J. Cameron whose daughter John married, there was living at Ridgewood one Alpin J. Cameron, who
usually wrote his name A. 5. Cameron, and was known by that
designation. This is a latent ambiguity, or one that does not
arise upon reading the will, but upon facts outside of it. It,
therefore, may be cleared up by evidence dekors the will. Alpin
J. Cameron, who was a son of Alexander J. Cameron, has never
been married, and therefore could not, at the date of the wvill,
have been intended as having a daughter of a marriageable age in
1879. Besides, it is shown that John had paid his addresses to
Jessie Cameron before 1868, in testator's life, and with his knowledge and seemingly without his disapprobation until John became
a Romanist, as was supposed by the testator through her influence
or that of her family. There can be no doubt that the testator meant a daughter of Alexander J. Cameron, who had marriageable daughters, and.not a daughter of Alpin J. Cameron who not
oly had no daughter but could have had none marriageable in
1879.
It is further contended that this condition is -void, because it
is in restraint of marriage, and because it requires Jinhn to do
rtn illegal and immoral act, to violate his engagement with his
present wife made and entered into before be knew of this provi.
sion in his father's will, and in fact before the will was executed.
Although the law, as to the validity of conditions in restraint
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of marriage, may be considered to a great extent unsettled both
'n England and this country, yet some points are settled so as
to be beyond controversy. The general rule is, that a condition in
restraint of marriage in general, or of marriage to any person whatever, is void, and the devise or bequest takes effect. But any one
may limit a gift to his wife to her widowhood, or may annex a
condition that it shall go over on her marriage; this is a wellestablished exception to the rule; so also where provision is made
for the support of daughters is long as they continue unmarried
and need support, where the evident intention is not to restrain
marriage, but to provide support.
On the other hand, in a gift to one as long as she continues to
live separate from her husband, or on condition that she live separate from her husband, the limitation or condition is void and
the gift is absolute; so any condition is void that is criminal,
illegal or contra bonos mores.
So also it is held that a father to whom the law gives positive
control over the marriage of his children while minors, and who
is at all times their proper and natural adviser and counsellor in
marriage connections, may annex to a gift a condition that it
shall be void if his child shall marry a particular person, or one
of a specified class, as a Scotchman, a Papist or Baptist, and
without question the condition in this case that John should not
marry a daughter of A. J. Cameron is valid, if it does not require him to do an illegal or immoral act to violate a legal and
binding contract to marry.
There is perhaps no adjudication that a condition which requires
the violation of &.binding, legal contract to marry is a void condition, or that it is a valid one; and it is not necessary here to
consider or determine that; as John was a minor until after his
marriage, the contract was not legal and binding. The common
law and the law of this state favor the control of a parent over
the marriages of minor children; such marriage, without consent
of a father in his lifetime, is forbidden, and although not declared
void, it subjects the person solemnizing it to a penalty. It is
against the policy as well as the provisions of our law to allcw a
contract by a minor to marry to be declared valid or binding so
as to make a condition in a father's will to defeat it void, and a
regard to the spirit of that law cannot be contra bonos mores.
On the contrary, it is the duty of the courts to favor this or

